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Abstract 
Service supply chain features human players as service vendor, service integrator, customer and service 
resource. It tends to be digitally connected, such as consulting, e-business and integrated enterprises. Our 
study uses a formal model and simulations to develop the effect of a service supply chain on equilibrium 
computation. Two insights arise on how a network can obtain equilibrium computation: forming the 
network structure of service supply chain; exploring entities behavior and equilibrium conditions. These 
results highlight the importance for service supply chain of adapting its network structure to equilibrium 
and application. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [CEIS 2011] 
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1. Introduction 
With the ever-growing importance of the service sector in economies, the notion of service supply 
chain (SSC) has obtained a more prominent role in contemporary operations management.  As more and 
more traditionally product based companies like IBM, Cisco and Pitney Bowes garner increasing 
proportions of their revenues from services. How can partners of service supply chain form temporary 
alignments to quickly respond to market/customer requirements as well as effectively utilize their 
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competencies? The ability to select suitable partners and effectively utilize their resources throughout the 
chain is a key to successful supply chain networks. The uncertainties and constraints may result in 
dynamisms and difficulties in searching, selecting, and coordinating the services. Relevant literature in 
this area can be found in workflow or business process management, where problems in managing 
activities under various resource and operational constrains are being investigated. 
Equilibrium is pervasive in service supply chain. The equilibrium state of service supply chain is an 
ideal and optimal state. Examples include development of decentralized models that allow for a 
generalized network structure and simplicity in computation in regards to the study of supply chains [1],
modeling the competition among firms that produce services for customers who are sensitive to delay 
time [2, 3], and equilibrium conditions [4, 5]. Equilibrium may contain integrated dynamic models [6-8].
Generally, it is equilibrium and not optimization that dominates service supply chain network problem 
solving.  
2. Model set up 
We build a model of a service supply chain that engages in equilibrium computation to solve a complex 
supply chain with many interdependent entities. Our model explicitly captures two fundamental 
characteristics of complex equilibrium: (1) service supply chain network equilibrium conditions, the 
customers take into account their consumption decision not only the price charged for the service by the 
integrators or service brokers but also the service volume to obtain the service, and (2) variation 
inequality formulation, the equilibrium conditions governing the supply chain network may be equivalent 
to the solution of the variation inequality problem, which coincides with the equilibrium service flow and 
price pattern. We consider N service vendors, with a typical service vendor denoted by n; M service 
integrators, with a typical service integrator denoted by m; X service brokers, with a typical service 
broker denoted by x; and customers associated with Y demand markets, with a typical demand customer 
or market denoted by y, as depicted in Fig. 1. The Service integrators have enormous influence over all of 
the activities involved in the service supply chain network. The Service brokers and the service 
integrators can be the same or separate business entities. The Service brokers are service branches of 
service products, and deal with service integrators and customers. Since service brokers do not make 
service change fundamentally, they are not explicitly represented by nodes in this network model. An 
implicit assumption is that the service integrators need to cover the direct service cost and consider 
whether service brokers should be used and how much service volume should be delivered. Here, 
however, we will assume that, because services cannot be stored, the service volume available at each 
service vendor is equal to the service volume transmitted. The links in the service supply chain network 
denote transaction links. 
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Now, for definiteness and easy reference, we explore the behavior and optimality conditions of the 
service vendors, the service integrators, and the customers at the demand markets. Meanwhile, we 
describe the service supply chain network equilibrium conditions and propose the equilibrium 
computation formulation.  
3. Entities behavior and optimality conditions  
Let ��� denote the service volume for service transaction by service vendor n to service integrator m. 
Since for each service vendor the total amount of service volume sold must be less than the total service 
volume of service products, the following conservation of service flow equation express relationship 
between the quantity of service transaction by service vendor n and the transmitted chains to service 
integrators:    �� � ∑ ������� , � � �� ��� �������                                           (1) 
Let ���  denote the unit price charged by service vendor n for service transaction with service 
integrator m, which is an endogenous variable and can be determined (i.e. the wholesale price). Due to (1) 
and note the assumption that individual service vendor is a profit-maximize people; we may express 
service generating cost associated with service vendor n, namely, �� as follows: ����� ≡ ����� for all � � �� ��� ��� where � is nm-dimensional vector of service transaction between service vendors and 
service integrators, � � ������ � �� ��� ���� � �� ��� ��� . �  is the service volume for service 
vendors sold, � � ∑ ������ . Therefore, the optimization case of service vendor n can be expressed as 
follows:    ���� ∑ ������ � ����� � ∑ ��������������� �                            (2)   
 where �������� is service transaction cost incurred by service vendor n in dealing with service 
integrator m. According to the existing literature [9-11], we can assume that the service generating cost and 
the service transaction cost functions for each service vendor are convex and continuously differentiable. 
Given �∗  and ���∗  in a non-cooperative game, the optimality conditions for all service vendors 
simultaneously may be expressed as the following formulation: 
∑ ∑ ������∗����� �
��������∗ �
���� � ����
�������� ������ � ���∗ � � �                       (3) 
Since service generating cost ��  is a function of the total service volume, we can obtain that the 
marginal service generating cost with respect to �� is equal to the marginal generating cost with respect 
to����, namely, ��������� ≡
������
���� . We can, thus, transform (3) into the following equivalent expression 
with respect to determine �∗ and �∗:
∑ �����∗���� � ��� � ��
∗����� � ∑ ∑ ��������� ��������
∗ �
���� � ���� � ���� � ���
∗ � � �     (4)  
The service integrators, in turn, are involved in transactions both with the service vendors since they 
wish to obtain the services for their integration service outlets, as well as with the customers, who are the 
ultimate purchasers of the services at demand markets. Since service cannot be stored, it is rational 
hypothesis that the total amount of the services sold by a service integrator is equal to the total service 
volumes that he ordered from the service vendors. This assumption can be represented as: 
∑ ∑ ���� � ∑ ��������������� � ��          (5)   � � �� ��� ���
Here ����  denotes the service volume for service transaction by service vendor n in transaction with 
demand market � via service broker��.
Let ����  denote the unit price charged by service integrator m for service transaction with demand 
market � via service broker��, which is an endogenous variable and can be determined (i.e. the retail 
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price). Due to (5) and note the assumption that individual service integrator seeks to maximize his own 
profit; we can express the optimization case of service integrator m as follows: 
���� ∑ ∑ ������������ ���� � ����� � ∑ ������ ����� ∑ �������� ���� �
∑ ∑ ������������ ����� �                                                                    (6)   
Here ����� denotes the operating cost of service integration by service integrator m, which is a 
function of the total service flows to the service integrator, that is, 	����� ≡ �����, � � ∑ ��������������		 denotes the transaction cost incurred by service integrator m in transaction with service 
vendor n. ���� ����� � denotes the transaction cost incurred by service integrator m in transaction with 
demand market � via service broker	�.
As mentioned, thinking of the literature [12, 13], we assume that the transaction costs and operating costs 
are all convex and continuously differentiable. Meanwhile, the service integrators compete in a non-
cooperative game. Therefore, the optimality conditions for all service integrators simultaneously may be 
expressed as the following formulation with respect to determine ����∗ 	 ����∗ 	 and �∗:	
∑ �����∗����
���� � ��� � ��∗ � � ∑ ∑ ∑ �����
� �����∗ �
����� � ���
�∗ ������������� � ����� � ����∗ �
�	∑ ∑ ���������∗ ����� � ����
�������� � ���� � ���∗ � � �																					(7)
Here,	the	marginal	cost	with	respect	to	δ�	is	equal	to	the	marginal	cost	with	respect	to	��� , 
namely,	��������� ≡
������
���� .
We now discuss the optimality conditions for the customers located at the demand markets. The 
customers care about two aspects for making their consumption decisions. One side is price charged for 
services by the service integrators or service brokers, the other is the service transaction cost to obtain the 
services. In our model, we assume that the demand for the services at each demand market is 
determinacy, which is denoted by the term ��. Hence, the following conservation equations must hold: �� � ∑ ∑ ������������ . In the optimality conditions, when the service volume purchased from the service 
integrators via service brokers is positive (����∗ � �), the optimality prices the customers are willing to 
pay for the services at the demand market will be precisely equal to the sum of the price charged by the 
service integrator and the unit transaction cost incurred by the customers. Namely, ��∗ � ����∗ ����� ��∗�. Where ��∗  denotes the demand price of the service at demand market �. ���� ��∗� denotes the 
unit transaction cost incurred by the customers located at the demand market � associated with service 
integrator m via service broker � . �∗  is ��� -dimensional vector of service 	�∗ � ����� �� ��, �,� , ��� � �, �,� ,�� � � �, �,� , ��. Otherwise, if the price charged by the service integrator plus 
the unit transaction cost exceed acceptable price by the customers, then there will be no service 
transaction (����∗ � �) between the service integrators and the customers. Therefore, the optimality 
conditions for all demand markets simultaneously may be expressed as the following formulation with 
respect to determine �∗: ∑ ∑ ∑ �����∗ � ���� ��∗�������������� � ����� � ����∗ �                           (8)	
4. Conclusion  
This study will look at how the internet is creating a new wave of business and technical models, which 
promise to boost productivity in the service sector. Service supply chain encompasses the planning and 
management of all activities involved in sourcing and procurement, conversion, and all service 
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management activities. We use a formal model to explore the effects of network structure on equilibrium 
computation with respect to entities behavior and equilibrium conditions. Previous work has explored that 
understanding of random networks (a node connects to other nodes by equal chance), regular networks (a 
node connects to other nodes by explicit design), and semi-regular networks (in between these two) and 
raises numerous topological patterns from various connection rules. This work has illuminated important 
managerial trade-offs, but it has represented network only in its limited form---with N service vendors 
(SV), M service integrators (IS), X service brokers (SB), and Y markets/ customers (MC) ---and has 
focused on equilibrium computation.  
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